A Few Remarks on the War
- Ameer Fakhoury
- 15 hours ago
- 6 min read
Naturally, in times of war, everyone is preoccupied with the war. There are those who rejoice in it – how terrible; those who view it as a necessity, something that must be done because there is no other choice; the minority that is horrified by it; and those who truly believe that we only want to liberate the Iranian people from an oppressive regime. In war, everyone is consumed by the war.
This text by Amir Fakhoury also deals with the war, but it does so from the unique perspective of a Palestinian with an Israeli citizenship, rooted in a deep belief in a shared society. It is a gaze that zooms out for a moment to see the big picture, and then breaks it down into smaller chunks, each of which provokes many thoughts and questions of its own. Read it and see for yourselves."
Ayala Shalev, Editor, That’s About Us
A Few Remarks on the War
Ameer Fakhoury
I hope all friends here are doing relatively well...
1. Many have written about Israeli militarism – from "Shooting and Crying" to "Shooting without Crying" (from Uri Ben-Eliezer’s War Instead of Peace to Yagil Levy’s The New Militarism in Israel). In short, militarism is when military force becomes, in the eyes of politics, the media, and society, the first, and even sole solution, and the logic of force takes precedence over all other logics, certainly over diplomacy.
2. Some attribute Israeli militarism to Israel's surplus military power – the idea that if you hold a hammer, the whole world looks like a nails. Others – and I am not being exhaustive here – like Hannah Arendt, believe it is a deterministic development linked to the establishment of a Jewish state in the heart of a hostile Arab world (this is less convincing to me). In any case, the fact that no significant Israeli politician, even from the opposition, has come out against the war (except for Arab politicians who oppose it, but don't quite offer an alternative framework for understanding reality, likely out of despair of convincing the Jewish majority), and the fact that 81% of Israelis support the war (which does not mean that expressing support is not part of the "national habitus"; what is learned as the 'right' thing to do) is further proof, quite sad, that Israel is completing its transformation into a "Super-Sparta”.
3. In Super-Sparta – and this is perhaps a very recent development – a consensus is not just manufactured around the war (in the US, you have Trump, but there is at least criticism from significant parts of the media, politics, and civil society); rather, a public sentiment has emerged that could be called "The Joy of War”. Israelis are commanded (by the likes of Nir Dvori or Avri Gilad, and I’m not sure who is worse) to truly rejoice in the existence of war, and certainly not to "exaggerate" their fears ("This is limited fire, not a barrage" = It's just a few ballistic missiles so shut up!).
4. It caught my eye today how a citizen from Kiryat Shmona unburdened himself on the Hadad-Duek program (two more militarist-Spartans) in a way that made them shift uncomfortably. Now is the time for "War-Jubilance". There is no suffering, no complaints, no hardships – "Together we will win". The coercion of a "war routine" is only part of it. The new Israeli regime in its physical manifestation is based, among other things, not only on the militarism of "Shooting without Crying", but also on "War-Jubilance."
5. The disillusionment from the claim made by some liberals, that Trump-Bibi – and it is unbelievable that this even needs to be written – are interested in "liberating" the Iranian people will be one of the quickest awakenings. Certainly so after the "liberators" fill the lungs of the people they seek to free with "oil-rain" that flows into their sewage systems and creates a potential climate catastrophe, and after they essentially destroy their country. This position would be considered a bad joke were it not a tragedy that exposes parts of the Israeli liberal group in an almost infantile simplicity of thought – and that is the charitable interpretation. There is no malice or hardheartedness behind this liberal stance, but I’m not sure that compensates in this case for what is truly embarrassing stupidity.
Image: chatGPT
6. Generally, among Israeli liberals, there is a discussion on the question: "How do we liberate the Iranian people?" The best answer to this question is: It is none of your business. It may be a matter for the UN or specific state coalitions acting according to international law (there is something called the "Responsibility to Protect" in international law), the law of nations, morality, and accepted practice – but it is certainly not the business of Israel or Israelis, for a thousand reasons. The first and sufficient reason is that one must discuss how to liberate the Palestinian people from under the Israeli boot, and then, or perhaps simultaneously, how to liberate Israeli Jews from the Israeli regime. (A government becomes a "regime" when it reaches into fields that are not the political field in order to shape them in a way that serves political control).
7. Benjamin Netanyahu – undoubtedly the most dangerous statesman in the world – has no problem tying Israel (self-declared as the State of the Jews) to a regional war that flirts with a world war. (Just this evening, Amit Segal reported to Yonit Levi, who remained indifferent, that Iran is trying to involve China and Russia [which is already involved] in the war). Is there anyone who understands the significance of this, especially what will be linked to the "Head of the Jewish People" if this happens? Is Israel in Gaza, and now in Iran, contributing to the unraveling of the liberal world order (admittedly imperfect) in favor of an imperial-mafia world order? How is it that no one is talking about this?
8. The shared civil society in Israel is the only ray of light here. It opposes the war, asks questions, and even – though not nearly enough – offers alternative frameworks of understanding, narratives, and modes of action. But it must do much more of that last element. The Jewish-Israeli public must be liberated from the grip of militaristic ignorance fed by its fears, whether invented or real. Palestinian citizens of Israel cannot do this alone, but a shared civil society certainly can. Some good people are already doing it, and they must be strengthened today and certainly in the difficult future we are walking into.
9. I will expand on the last point only for those truly interested. The gap in positions between Jews and Arabs in Israel regarding the state’s wars does not stem only from familiar political disagreements, but from a deeper and less discussed divide: a disagreement over Israel's geopolitical location in the world. Many disputes between the groups already receive public discourse – for example, on the nature of the regime (can it be Jewish and Democratic?), on the sources of national inequality (is it a bug or a feature?), on the memory of the state’s establishment (was there or wasn't there a Nakba? And if there was, is there responsibility or guilt alongside responsibility?), on the role of the army in society, on modes of legitimate Palestinian resistance, or the political solution. However, beneath all these lies a more fundamental disagreement: Is Israel perceived as part of the West acting in the Middle East, or as part of the regional space itself?
10. This gap is particularly evident in the discussion surrounding the first war against Iran (the first war against a non-Arab state that Palestinians with Israeli citizenship opposed). Among many Arab writers, the war is seen as part of a broader Western-imperial power structure. For example, it is argued that Israel acts as a regional arm for American interests, and that the war is linked to broad geopolitical struggles over world order and regional power (it is quite difficult to refute this given the statements of Israeli politicians). Others emphasize the fear that military achievements will strengthen a regional project of Israeli supremacy, or deepen the perception of Israel as a "Western entity" struggling against an "Eastern" world. Alongside geopolitical arguments, an emotional dimension also appears. Some writers describe a sense of alienation from the Israeli emotional community when public discourse is mobilized around national and militaristic metaphors. Others express deep anxiety over regional escalation and its internal consequences for democracy and the Arab minority.
11. All this is to say that the gap between this disagreement over Israel's geopolitical place and the level of attention given to this disagreement among promoters of a shared society in Israel – compared to other disputes – is simply scandalous, especially given the damage this lack of processing causes to partnership efforts. I would go as far as to say that on shared platforms, agreement can be found on all the disputes I listed above, except for this one.
12. Finally: The Palestinian heart (wounded and bleeding after two years of a war of annihilation) is filled with frustration and even rage at the Israeli audacity, bullying, and brutality revealed these days more than ever. But it also holds a certain sadness – sadness about the fact that an entire people living with it is commanded to bite its lip, to rejoice in war, to suffer in silence, to be a lion, a predator or a Tyrannosaurus Rex instead of just being a citizen. This sadness must be turned into the foundation for politics that will redeem the peoples of this land from the disaster they are in.
Ameer Fakhoury is a legal expert, sociologist, and researcher at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.
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